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IN BRIEF
The 2020 US Election and its climate consequences
Elizabeth Bomberg
Politics and International Relations, University of Edinburgh, UK
ABSTRACT
This ‘In Brief’ article analyses the 2020 US national election (presidential and 
congressional) and its implications for environment and climate policy in the US 
and globally. Drawing on insights from electoral politics, partisanship and 
executive power, it explores three broad areas: the issues at stake during the 
campaign and the centrality of climate, explanations for the outcome, and 
reflections on what lies ahead for the US role under a Biden Presidency.
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For observers of environmental and climate politics the 2020 US Election was 
one of the most consequential in US history. At stake was a choice to re-elect 
or vote out an Administration noted for its climate denialism, evisceration of 
environmental protection, and abrogation of global environmental leader-
ship. Also up for grabs was control of the US Congress and key ‘down ballot’ 
races within the 50 US states. The outcome would have a tremendous impact 
on US domestic policy (both environmental protection and climate), but also 
on the US’s global role. This In Brief article examines the issues at stake 
during the campaign, explanations for the outcome, and reflections on what 
lies ahead for the US role under a Biden Presidency.
The 2020 US Election campaign
Theories of voting behaviour seldom identify environment or climate as 
a key issue shaping voter choice. Nor have environmental issues featured 
prominently in any previous US presidential campaigns. The 2020 election 
campaign was very different. Climate featured as an election concern as early 
as the primary season (during which the parties’ presidential nominees are 
chosen). Every candidate for the Democratic nomination offered some sort 
of climate plan, and a special town forum on the issue was held in summer 
2020. Competition amongst Democratic contenders – several of whom 
placed climate central to their bid – served to ratchet up Biden’s own climate 
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plans which became increasingly ambitious and encompassing. During the 
general election campaign climate, environmental protection, energy and 
fracking all figured prominently in both Presidential and Vice Presidential 
debates. The voters as a whole rated climate as a key concern with some 
demographics (especially youth) ranking it within the top three. Of course, 
like many other issues in contemporary US, views on climate and environ-
ment differed sharply between parties; Democrats were nearly four times as 
likely to rate climate as a key issue, while the most conservative Republicans 
continued to deny the basic link between climate and human activities (Pew 
Research 2020).
Candidates from the two competing parties also put out starkly different 
views. Indeed, protection of the environment and climate was one of the 
issues on which the contrast between them was most sharply drawn. Donald 
Trump’s views were well known and he stayed true to form during the 
campaign – denying human responsibility for climate change, dismissing 
the devastating floods and wildfires, and suggesting in any case the world 
would ‘start getting cooler.’ One possible surprise was Trump’s announce-
ment of a new moratorium on off-shore drilling in three flood-vulnerable, 
Republican-held crucial battleground states. The announcement was accom-
panied by Trump’s claim to be ‘the Number 1 environmental president’ – 
a curious statement given his Administration had been the one to earlier lift 
the moratorium. In any case not many agreed with his self-assessment: 
according to Gallup (2020) Trump’s lowest public approval rating was in 
the area of climate and environment. But the announcement did suggest an 
awareness of the need to address – however fleetingly or superficially – the 
issue of environment.
The Democratic ticket of Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris made environ-
ment and climate a key issue of the campaign, linking it explicitly to recovery 
and renewal, and elevating climate to one of four interlinked historic crises 
they pledged to address (the others were the Covid pandemic, economic 
recovery and racial justice). During the campaign Biden drew on high-profile 
environmentalists – including from the activist left – to help shape his 
climate plan. That plan included tackling climate as a ‘top priority’, linking 
it to issues of injustice and promising stronger use of regulatory tools. His 
pledge of ‘100% clean energy economy and net-zero emissions no later than 
2050’ signalled both deeper and faster cuts of carbon emissions than any of 
his predecessors had achieved. At the centre of his plan was promised 
investment (of 2 USD trillion) in green technologies. His running mate 
Kamala Harris had endorsed early on the US Green New Deal (a more 
ambitious and encompassing initiative including guaranteed jobs and health 
care for all), and had worked with House Representative Alexandria Ocasio- 
Cortez on climate justice and equity legislation. Biden stopped short of 
embracing a Green New Deal, and his policies also included support for 
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nuclear power, carbon capture, and a refusal to ban fracking. His position 
was therefore not considered radical (or even sufficient) to many environ-
mentalists. But compared to any previous presidential nominee his ambition 
was well marked. His proposed policies were – if not radical – still radically 
different from those of Trump or the governing Republican party.
The issue of climate and environment did not decide the election; tradi-
tional factors of economy and party loyalty, as well as new issues such as the 
pandemic, dominated voter preferences. Party affiliation in particular proved 
a strong predictor of both voting preferences and views on climate. To 
illustrate: according to exit polls, the 30% of voters who did not consider 
climate change a serious problem voted overwhelmingly Republican and 
overwhelmingly supported Trump. Nor did the polls suggest that the unpo-
pularity of Trump’s environment and climate policies was enough to result 
in a complete renunciation by voters. Millions of voters chose to support 
Trump despite his views on climate and a record of environmental 
devastation.
But of those 80 million who voted for Biden – he not only won the 
Electoral College but amassed a lead of over 7 million votes – Biden’s support 
for climate action was central and tied directly to issues of equity and 
pandemic relief. The climate issue affected outcome and turnout in several 
ways. The issue was a key mobilizer for the youth vote. According to 
a Harvard study (2019) young voters are far more likely to rate climate as 
one of top three issues, linked closely to the issues of racial justice and equity. 
In this election the youth demographic increased dramatically: 53% of 
eligible youth voters cast votes in this election versus 45% in 2016 (Circle 
2020). According to exit polls (New York Times 2020), of those young voters, 
65% backed Biden – up from the 55% who voted for Clinton in 2016. In 
short, a record number of youth voters – motivated heavily by concerns of 
justice and climate – were instrumental in ensuring Biden’s victory.
Voters in the 2020 election did not just choose a President. Crucial to any 
President’s agenda success is the support his party holds in Congress. The 
Biden Administration needed Democrat congressional victories to keep 
control of the lower House, but also a net gain of seats to secure control of 
the Senate from the Republicans. Democrats did not fare as well as expected 
in House elections but did manage to hang on to a slim majority. More nail- 
biting was the outcome in the Senate. The final balance was not determined 
until January following two run-off Senate elections in Georgia. The outcome 
(announced 6 January) was overshadowed by news of the attack on the 
Capitol by a Trump-supporting mob seeking to halt certification of Biden’s 
victory. But the insurrection did not stop Biden’s victory or the victory of 
Democrats in both Georgia races. Those gains now give Democrats the 
majority control of both Houses. A simple majority won’t ensure smooth 
passage of bills (given the role of the filibuster and other blocking measures 
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in the Senate), but it did bring changes in committee priorities and leader-
ship which will make a Biden agenda more likely to be heard – if not moved 
forward.
In short, the issue of climate and environment featured in this federal 
election as never before. The Biden ticket’s emphasis on climate – including 
its link to recovery and equity – served as a core mobilization device, 
especially amongst core constituencies of youth and voters of colour. For 
environmentalists the climate issue did not feature as heavily as it should 
have done; nor was it decisive to the electoral outcome. But the inverse is 
certainly true: the electoral outcome has decisively affected the future of 
environment and climate policies both in the US and beyond.
The transition
The promised change of a new Biden Presidency was evident during the 
transition as Biden named his Cabinet posts and team. These appointments 
underlined a clear commitment to addressing climate, and a shift in envir-
onmental priorities (Bomberg 2021). A central office in this endeavour is the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which is tasked with, inter alia, 
regulating power plant emissions, cleaning up toxic dumps, and enforcing 
core laws. Trump’s appointments to lead this core agency were a series of 
former oil men with a zeal for deregulation, culminating in a stunning 
rollback of core environmental regulations and oversight. (According to 
Justice Department data, the number of pollution cases referred for criminal 
prosecution under Trump’s EPA was the lowest in over 30 years.) Biden’s 
choice marked a reversal: Michael S. Regan, a former state environmental 
official and the first Black man to be appointed to the role, was chosen 
because of his strong record of enforcement and focus on environmental 
justice.
Other cabinet nominations underlined the theme of reversal. To head the 
Interior Department Biden appointed Representative Deb Haaland, the first 
Native American cabinet secretary, champion of Green New Deal, and 
a staunch opponent of Trump’s handling of land use. The Department of 
Interior manages the listing of endangered species and huge swathes of 
federal lands, including wildlife refuges and national parks. Heading the 
Department of Energy is an outspoken clean energy advocate Jennifer 
Granholm who, like Biden, sees clean energy as a huge economic opportu-
nity – including for blue collar workers. Tasked with slashing emissions from 
the transport sector in particular, Granholm has promised to work closely 
with auto and labour unions (with which she has already close links). The 
Granholm appointment represents a shift in environmental and energy 
priorities, but also represents Biden’s emphasis on reaching out to traditional 
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Democratic voters, and his view that climate protection and economic 
recovery are inextricably, and positively, linked.
Even more striking is Biden’s creation of new posts explicitly charged with 
incorporating and championing issues of climate change across the entire 
policy agenda. Gina McCarthy (who served under President Obama as head 
of the EPA) leads the new White House Office of Domestic Climate Policy. 
Her remit is clear: ensuring climate is not treated as a discrete area of policy 
but is integrated into all other areas of policy. The other new post is the 
appointment of former Secretary of State John Kerry as special Climate 
envoy at the National Security Council. Kerry, who signed the Paris climate 
Agreement on behalf of the US in 2015, underlines the Administration’s 
global engagement but also the link between climate and security (a link 
severed by Trump who removed climate change from a list of national 
security threats in 2019). The signal these appointments send is unequivocal – 
a clear pivot away from the previous Administration’s priorities, and towards 
a far more ambitious, progressive embrace of climate and environmental 
protection at home and abroad.
Early action
Biden wasted no time in implementing environmental promises made dur-
ing the campaign. On his first afternoon in office, immediately following his 
Inauguration ceremony, Biden signed several executive orders reversing 
Trump’s legacy. One of the first and most notable actions was re-joining 
the UN Paris Climate Agreement. Biden and his international climate envoy 
John Kerry immediately began to reassert US global leadership on this issue. 
In addition to re-joining the Agreement the US announced its intention to 
host and lead a global climate summit on Earth Day in April 2021. Biden has 
also indicated he will personally attend the next UN’s Conference of the 
Parties in Glasgow (COP26) in November 2021 where national emission 
reductions commitments are to be ‘ratcheted up’ and the tricky issue of 
international finance resolved (the Trump Administration had revoked the 
US commitment of international climate finance.) A key factor in global 
climate negotiations will be the ability of the US to develop (and indeed reset) 
relations with China. Kerry worked closely with Chinese leadership in talks 
surrounding Paris agreement, but relations since 2015 have soured, and it 
remains uncertain how or if these two giant emitters will cooperate or 
compete to make CoP26 a success. Of course the main ‘Paris challenge’ 
needs to be delivered at home. Under the Paris Agreement the US 
Nationally Determined Contribution pledge was to reduce US emissions by 
at least 26% by 2025: for the international community the real test is not just 
pledges made but whether the US can deliver the domestic action needed to 
meet its promised target.
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An encouraging sign was that Biden’s early days which were chock full of 
domestic climate and environmental declarations and actions. Within a week 
of his Inauguration President Biden had repeated his warning that climate 
posed an existential threat. He reasserted his campaign promise of immedi-
ate action and pledge to achieve net-zero emissions on the power grid by 
2035 and economy-wide by 2050. Specifically, he announced a halt on all new 
oil leases on federal land, ambitious water and land conservation policies, job 
measures linked to renewable energy, and plans to electrify the government’s 
vast fleet of vehicles.
Crucially, Biden very much pitched these policies as part of US economic 
recovery, declaring ‘Today is climate day in the White House which means 
today is jobs day at the White House.’ Central to his plans was investment 
linked to growing demands for renewable energy – especially wind and 
solar – which, according to Biden would not just replace but surpass the 
number of jobs lost due to the decline of jobs in the coal and fracking 
industries. His team took care to underline the feasibility of transition, 
noting how well the skills required to install and manufacture solar panels 
and wind turbines matched those of workers employed in sectors like mining 
and offshore drilling. Moreover, his orders created a task force specifically 
focussed on reviving communities dependent on the fossil fuel industry. He 
promised jobs linked to construction work building new energy-efficient 
homes, or engineering work sealing off leaking oil and gas wells. Similarly, 
he stressed that speeding up the transition away from gasoline-powered cars 
to an all electric fleet would ultimately lead to ‘one million new jobs in the 
American automobile industry.’ He addressed youth employment specifi-
cally, announcing the creation of Civilian Climate Corps which would 
provide young people with ‘good jobs’ as well as training them for envir-
onmentally friendly careers. In short, these announcements were indeed 
about addressing climate change, but they were couched unmistakably in 
the language of domestic job creation and equitable economic renewal.
Many of these initiatives landed on fertile soil and supported existing 
trends. Oil and gas producers were already struggling under weak prices, 
while wind and solar technologies industries (and stocks) have been robust 
and growing dramatically for years. Even under the Trump Administration 
shifts within the markets, finance sector, as well as on-going climate initia-
tives by US cities and states were moving ahead to transition to a clean 
energy (Bomberg 2017). But a clear message from the top is crucial for 
encouraging (and reassuring) actors already keen to push further towards 
carbon transition. As noted by one observer, proponents no longer need to 
fear an anti-wind energy tweet tirade from a president who once claimed the 
sound of wind turbines caused cancer (Burke 2019).
None of this means Biden’s moves will go unopposed. Those on the left of 
his party – including a strong contingent of youth and environmental justice 
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advocates – have already protested his announcements do not go far enough 
(for instance he has halted but not completely banned oil leasing on federal 
lands). These activists demand more and reminded the Biden team that their 
mobilization was crucial to his election. Opposition from the right has been 
sharper. Indeed within minutes of Biden signing his order to halt drilling on 
federal land an alliance representing oil and gas producers filed a lawsuit, 
arguing he had exceeded his authority. The large number of Court appoint-
ments – another key presidential power – made by the Trump 
Administration has resulted in far more jurists arguably less amenable to 
Biden’s proposed executive rules. Moreover, several congressional republi-
cans were quick to claim moves as ‘job destroying,’ a claim repeated on Fox 
News. While that opposition is not surprising, it highlights a real weakness in 
Biden’s moves so far. His action has been overwhelmingly focused on uni-
lateral executive orders.
Executive orders are not legislation, they are executive action which can be 
signed – and later revoked- by presidential action alone. They cannot replace 
legislation but rather allow the President to give guidance to federal agencies 
as part of his constitutional duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed’. These orders have become absolutely central to climate and 
environmental politics in the US, especially in periods of divided power 
(one party holding power in Congress, the other the White House). 
Obama used them for his Clean Power Plan; Trump was far more zealous, 
signing dozens as part of his attempt to overturn or chip away swathes of 
measures designed to protect the environment and combat climate change.
But executive orders have neither the stability nor the durability of actual 
legislation. National legislation must be introduced and approved by Congress – 
it is far more difficult to overturn or reverse, and tends to endure even when 
opposition emerges and electoral fortunes change. Prospects for legislative 
change remain highly uncertain. Bills need the support of both Houses, and 
Democrat control of the Senate is razor thin (50–50 tie with Vice President 
Kamala Harris able to cast a tie-breaking vote). Nor are all of Biden’s planned 
legislative proposals certain to receive all 50 Democratic votes. Senators from 
West Virginia and Arizona have already voiced concern about the reach of 
Biden’s more ambitious climate proposals. Moreover, under current rules 
Senate legislation on most matters requires not a simple majority but a ‘filibuster- 
busting’ 60 votes. Filibusters allow the minority to stall or block legislative 
proposals. They are intended to underline the Senate’s role as a more deliberative, 
consensus seeking chamber though they have not had that effect under recent 
administrations.
An important if temporary means around this institutional barrier is through 
the use of budget reconciliation measures which require only a simple majority in 
the Senate rather than the 60 votes needed to overcome the threat of filibuster. 
Such measures must be specific to budgets – they instruct congressional 
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committees to change spending, revenues or deficits by a specified amount. Biden 
and Congressional Democrats used this technique to pass the American 
Recovery Plan (APA) in March 2021 – a massive 1.9 USD trillion measure 
which included significant climate-related provisions such as funding for federal 
energy agencies, city and state environmental projects, and energy assistance for 
low-income households. Even bolder is Biden’s mammoth 2 USD trillion 
‘American Jobs Plan’ which may also be passed under budget reconciliation 
rules. Nominally an infrastructure bill, it is infused with climate measures, 
including funding for research and development on ‘cutting-edge clean technol-
ogy’, billions for public transport, re-training workers, retrofitting and weath-
erising buildings, electrifying vehicles, replacing lead pipes, and climate 
adaptation measures designed to make infrastructure more resilient to extreme 
weather events (White House 2021).
These recovery bills are not the same as the overarching climate bill desired by 
Biden, and there are limits. They need to be reviewed annually, and voting on 
them looks likely to be entirely along partisan lines – not a single Republican 
supported the APA. These do not, in other words, signal a move to a more 
bipartisan approach to climate policy. Republicans continue to bristle at what 
they say are Biden’s ‘radical’ rules undermining his promise of unity. Even so, if 
these recovery budget bills are deemed a success (they already are hugely popular 
with the public) and their climate-linked provisions take hold, it could well serve 
as the start of a larger transformation sought by Biden and his supporters. What 
will matter mightily is the success of Biden’s early policies and how they are 
supported by the public and voters. That timing matters because his party’s 
control of Congress might only last until the next midterm congressional election 
in November 2022.
Conclusion
This In Brief analysis has suggested that a change in US climate and envir-
onmental legislation might not be as radical as some environmental advo-
cates would like. That legislative outcome is not due to a lack of presidential 
concern, but because of continued institutional barriers and partisan intran-
sigence. We should expect Biden’s policy changes to focus more on budget-
ary, infrastructure or sector-specific regulatory measures and investment. 
We can also expect legal challenges and fierce partisan opposition. However, 
by linking climate to recovery and using the latter to introduce an ambitious 
swathe of climate-linked policy measures, the Biden Administration is 
attempting an important climate policy feat: embedding climate into legisla-
tion without passing climate legislation itself.
The election of the Biden presidency is also not just about legislative change. 
A new Administration can signal and set a new tone, one that can motivate actors 
already engaged with changing mindsets and markets. In these ways the US 2020 
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election did herald a radical departure in priorities and ambition. The signals sent 
by this Administration are unmistakable – climate matters and the US is engaged. 
It is now for other actors – movements, cities, states, markets, lawmakers and 
global partners – to seize on that opportunity and bring about the more funda-
mental, long-lasting shift required.
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